Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in 2 structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the 3 number of connections between individuals are more conducive to the spread of cooperative behaviours. In 4 this article we show that such a conclusion largely depends on the individual-level interactions that take place.
Introduction

24
Population structure has long been known to affect the outcome of an evolutionary process [1] [2] [3] [4] . tionary graph theory has emerged as a convenient framework for modelling structured populations [4, 5] .
26
Individuals reside on vertices of the graph and the edges define the interaction neighbourhoods.
27
A variety of processes have been investigated on a number of graph classes. However, few analytical 28 results exist in general, since an arbitrary graph may not exhibit sufficient symmetry to aid calculations.
29
The most general class of graphs for which analytical results are known is the class of homogeneous (vertex- In the simplest case there are two strategic types: cooperators that provide a benefit b to their interaction 40 partner at some cost c to themselves (b > c > 0), whereas defectors provide neither benefits nor incur costs.
41
This basic setup is known as an instance of the prisoner's dilemma and reflects a conflict of interest because 42 mutual cooperation yields payoff b − c > 0 and hence both parties prefer this outcome over mutual defection, 43 which yields a payoff of zero. However, at the same time each party is tempted to defect in order to avoid 44 the costs of cooperation. The temptation of increased benefits for unilateral defection thwarts cooperation
45
-to the detriment of all. This conflict of interest characterizes social dilemmas [11, 12] .
46
A B A 1 S B T 0 Table 1 . The payoff matrix for a general 2 by 2 strategy game. Here S and T are real numbers.
47
More general kinds of interactions between two individuals and two strategic types, A and B, can be 48 represented in the form of a 2 × 2 payoff matrix as in Table 1 . The payoffs garnered from these game selected for reproduction with a probability proportional to its fitness and then the clonal offspring replaces 80 a (uniformly) randomly selected neighbour -or, if first an individual is selected at random to die and then 81 the vacant site is repopulated with the offspring of a neighbouring individual with a probability proportional 82 to its fitness. Even in homogenous populations the sequence of events is of crucial importance but becomes 83 even more pronounced in heterogenous structures [10, 20] .
84
In order to illustrate that the population dynamics may bestow an advantage to individuals occupying example of this is a 3-line graph, one central vertex connected to two end vertices. In the birth-death process,
93
the central vertex is replaced with probability 2/3, while either end vertex is replaced with probability 1/6, 94 while in the death-birth process, the central vertex replaces either end vertex with probability 2/3 and either
95
end replaces the centre with probability 1/6 [21]. The upshot is, even though the fitness of all individuals 96 is the same, the effective number of offspring produced depends on the dynamics as well as an individual's 97 location in the population.
98
The intrinsic advantage of some vertices over others can be further enhanced through game interactions 99 leading to differences in fitness that depend on an individual's strategy as well as its position on the graph. 
where δ > 0 denotes the strength of selection and n i is the number of interactions experienced by i. The 134 limit δ → 0 recovers the neutral process, where selection does not act. Note that the payoff matrix in Table   135 1 can still be used without loss of generality because adding a constant κ merely changes the (arbitrary)
136
baseline fitness from 1 to e δκ and multiplying the payoffs by λ is identical to simply changing the selection 137 strength to δλ.
138
The exponential form of fitness in the above equations is mathematically convenient since it guarantees 139 that the fitness is always positive, irrespective of the strength of selection and payoff values. It is worth
140
noting that if the strength of selection is weak, that is, δ 1, then
which represents another common form for fitness found in the literature [8] . for all i.
160
An individual on vertex i is selected to interact with vertex j with a probability proportional to w ij .
161
In this case we say vertex i has initiated the interaction. Interactions with self are excluded by requiring 
where the fraction indicates the probability that vertex i participates in one particular interaction either by 165 initiating it (first sum in numerator) or initiated by neighbours of i (second sum in numerator). On average 
177
In order to illustrate that the number of interactions experienced by an individual depends on which 178 vertex they reside, consider an arbitrary, random, undirected graph and assume that the degrees of adjacent 179 vertices are uncorrelated. Under this assumption the approximate probability that vertices i and j are 180 connected by an edge is 
Hence, the number of interactions of one vertex scales linearly with its degree.
183
Similarly, each vertex can initiate the same number of interactions, m. Then, with probability w ji /d j 184 the neighbouring vertex j initiates an interaction with i:
Again, vertices with a degree greater (less) than the average degree are expected to have more (fewer)
186
interactions than on average. Interaction rates on various heterogenous networks are shown in Fig. 2 .
187
This indicates that on undirected graphs uniform interaction rates can be achieved only on regular graphs,
188
where all vertices have the same number of neighbours.
189
Heterogenous populations
190
In recent years the focus has shifted from homogenous populations to heterogenous structures and, in par- Here we focus on a related imitation process where an individual i is chosen at random to reassess its 211 strategy by comparing its performance to a randomly chosen neighbour j. Individual i then imitates the 212 strategy of j with probability their location on the graph, whereas for accumulated payoffs everyone plays the same game but at different an evolutionary process in heterogeneous, graph-structured populations.
225
Criteria for Evolutionary Success
226
In order to determine the evolutionary success of a strategic type in a finite population we consider three as the stationary distribution of the Markov chain and satisfy the balance equation
where µ A (µ B ) is the probability an A (B) appears in the all-B (all-A) population. For homogeneous such as the stag-hunt game.However, for payoff matrices that satisfy equal-gains-from-switching, such as 252 Table 2 , ρ A > ρ 0 implies ρ B < ρ 0 and vice versa in unstructured populations or for weak selection [44].
253
The above conditions (12) and (15) 
In general, µ A and µ B depend on the population structure as well as the payoffs and their accounting. The 264 star structure serves as an illustrative example in the next section.
265
Similarly, the second condition also needs to be made more explicit. In general, to determine whether 266 a mutation is beneficial its fixation probability should exceed the probability that in the corresponding 267 monomorphic population one particular individual eventually establishes as the common ancestor of the 268 entire population. We denote these monomorphic fixation probabilities by ρ AA , and ρ BB , respectively.
269
Thus, the second condition, Eq. (13), should be interpreted as
i.e. that the fixation probability of a single A (or B) mutant in a B (A) population exceeds that of one B
271
(A) individual turning into the common ancestor of the entire population. where N is the population size.
282
In summary, due to the fitness differences in a monomorphic A population with accumulated payoffs 283 the turnover is accelerated and more strategy updates take place and hence more errors occur than in the 284 corresponding monomorphic B population. This means that, on average, mutant Bs more frequently attempt 285 to invade an A population than vice versa.
286
The Star Graph
287
The star graph represents the simplest, highly heterogenous structure. A star graph of size N + 1 consist of 288 a central vertex, the hub, which is connected to all N leaf vertices. On the star graph the range of degrees 289 is maximal -the hub has degree N and all leaves have degree one.
290
In order to illustrate the differences arising from accumulating and averaging payoffs, consider a situation Table 1 . Hence there is no discrimination between vertices of 306 different degrees. An illustration of the differences arising from payoff accounting for the simpler and more 307 intuitive case of the prisoner's dilemma in terms of costs and benefits (see Table 2 ), is given in Fig. 4 .
308
In particular, on star graphs or, more generally, on scale-free networks, averaged payoffs result in higher 309 and hence less favourable cost-to-benefit ratios for most individuals in the population, those with the lower 310 degree vertices. Naturally these differences are also reflected in the evolutionary dynamics. We demonstrate 311 this through the fixation probabilities of a single A (B) type in a population of B (A) types.
312
Let us first consider the fixation probability of a single A type, ρ A . Because of the heterogenous population 313 structure, ρ A depends on the location of the initial A -for a star graph, whether the A originated in the 314 hub or one of the leaves. We denote the two fixation probabilities by ρ A|H and ρ A|L , respectively. With 315 probability N/(N + 1) one of the leaves is chosen to update its strategy and the hub with probability 316 1/(N + 1). For averaged payoffs the fitnesses of everyone is the same in a monomorphic B population and 317 hence the hub is equally likely to adopt the strategy of a leaf, and make a mistake with probability µ 1,
318
as are leaves that are adopting the hubs strategy. Hence the average fixation probability is given by
In contrast, for accumulated payoffs even in a homogenous population the hub does not necessarily have the 320 same payoffs as the leaves because of the larger number of interactions. However, for our payoff matrix in 321 
However, for accumulated payoffs, the hub achieves a payoff of N + 1 as compared to an average payoff of 329 merely 1 + 1/N for the leaves. In order to determine the average fixation probability of a single B type, rise to an A type in the hub with a small probability. Based on these probabilities we can now determine 336 the proportion of mutants that occur in the leaves and the hub, respectively. For the leaves we get
and similarly for the hub
Thus, the average fixation probability of a single B mutant is
In the weak selection limit, δ 1 (or, more precisely, δN 1 A mutants arise at a rate µ A = 1/2µ. In contrast, in a monomorphic A population the hub has a much 350 higher fitness and leaves will almost surely imitate the hub (whereas the hub almost surely will not imitate 351 a leaf):
For large N every update essentially results in one of the leaves imitating the hub, so that µ B ≈ µ.
353
Equations (16) 
and in the limit of infinite populations, N → ∞, the conditions reduce to
A detailed derivation of the different fixation probabilities is provided in the Materials and Methods section.
359
In order to determine whether a mutant is favoured or not (see Eq. (15) 
Intuitively, the hub individual becomes the common ancestor with probability 1/2 because any leaf individual 365 updates its strategy to the hub's with a probability of 1/2 and the hub keeps its strategy also with probability 366 of 1/2 but both probabilities are independent of the size of the population. Conversely, a leaf individual 367 must first be imitated by the hub, which is 1/N times less likely than the reverse. On average we then obtain
368
(insert into Eq. (16)):
Note that in a monomorphic B population the payoffs are zero regardless of the selection strength, δ, location
370
(hub and leaves) or the payoff accounting. Again, this is a consequence of our particular choice of payoff 371 matrix (Table 1) , and thus, Eq. (22) holds for both averaged as well as accumulated payoffs and is, in fact,
372
the same as the neutral fixation probability ρ 0 . 
Now we are able to derive the conditions under which an A and/or B mutant is beneficial, c.f. Eq. (15):
for averaged payoffs and, for accumulated payoffs,
The parameter region which delimits the region of evolutionary success of A and B types is illustrated in process where a randomly chosen individual i initiates an interaction with probability ω with a random 410 neighbour j and reassesses its strategy with probability 1 − ω by comparing its payoff to that of a random 
437
Regardless of the structure, the positive feedback between payoff aggregation and the diminishing chances scale-free networks and lattices become virtiually indistinguishable in their ability to support cooperation.
450
For both lattices and scale-free networks an optimal ratio between strategy updates and interactions exist: 
482
In order to investigate the disparity in the number of interactions on the success of strategies on heteroge-483 nous graphs we introduced the time-scale parameter ω, which determines the probability that an interaction The time scale parameter ω introduced in the Stochastic Interactions and Updates section seems to aid 501 in promoting coexistence in both types of graphs, based on the large green region in Figures 3, 6 , and 8.
502
Exactly how the time scale parameter ω promotes coexistence is a topic worthy of further investigation.
503
Naturally there is no correct way of modelling the updating of the population or the aggregation of payoffs 504 but, as so often, the devil is in the detail and implicit assumptions originating in traditional, homogenous 505 models may be misleading or have unexpected consequences in more general, heterogenous populations.
506
Materials and Methods
507
In [45], the authors calculate expressions for the probability that a single mutant fixes on a star graph. These 
and for a single A on the hub,
where, in both cases,
For the imitation process defined by Eq. 8 and accumulated payoffs we have
and for averaged payoffs,
These are incorporated into the Eqs. (26) and (27) (17), and (18). Finally, a first-order approximation in δ is found for the above.
518
For example,
The other fixation probabilities are found in a similar way: Table 1 ). In each panel the four quadrants indicate the four basic types of generalized social dilemmas: prisoner's dilemma (upper left), snowdrift or co-existence games (upper right), stag hunt or coordination games (lower left) and harmony games (lower right). Homogenous populations are represented by 50 × 50 lattices with von Neumann neighbourhood (degree d = 4) and heterogenous populations are represented by Barabási-Albert scale-free networks (size N = 2500, average degreed = 4). The population is updated according to the imitation rule Eq. (8). The colours indicate the equilibrium fraction of strategy A (left and middle columns) ranging from A dominates (blue), equal proportions (green), to B dominates (red). Increases in equilibrium fractions due to heterogeneity are shown in blue shades (right column) and decreases in shades of red. The intensity of the colour indicates the strength of the effect. Accumulated payoffs in heterogenous populations shift the equilibrium in support of the more efficient strategy A except for harmony games where A dominates in any case (bottom right quadrant). Conversely, for averaged payoffs the support of strategy A is much weaker and even detrimental for T < 1 + S. Parameters: initial configuration is a random distribution of equal proportions of strategies A and B; each simulation run follows 1.6 · 10 7 updates and the equilibrium frequency of A is averaged over the last 2.5 · 10 6 updates; results are averaged over 500 independent runs; for scale-free networks the network is regenerated every 50 runs. No mutations occured during the simulation run. Table 2 , an A type individual (blue) on the hub provides a benefit b to each leaf, regardless of whether the payoffs are a accumulated or b averaged. For each interaction, the costs to the hub amount to c in the accumulated case whereas only c/N in the averaged case. Conversely, the costs to a type A leaf are always c and it provides a benefit b to the hub if payoffs are accumulated whereas only b/N when averaged. Hence for averaged payoffs an A type hub provides a benefit to each leaf at a fraction of the costs while A type leaves provide a fraction of the benefits to the hub. This means that the leaves and the hub are playing different games. More specifically, the cost-to-benefit ratio of A leaves is N c/b while it is c/(N b) for an A hub. For most of the population (the leaves), this ratio is much larger than for accumulated payoffs where the cost-to-benefit ratio is c/b. As a consequence cooperation is much more challenging if payoffs are averaged rather than accumulated. Figure 6. Average fraction of strategy A for different ratios between interactions and strategy updates in homogenous (top row) and heterogeneous (middle row) populations and the difference between them (bottom row) as a function of the game parameters S and T (c.f. Fig. 3 ). Interactions occur with probability ω and strategy updates with 1 − ω. For example, for ω = 0.9 each individual has, on average, initiated 9 interactions between strategy updates but only an average of 1/9 interactions for ω = 0.1. For small ω effects of heterogenous population structures have little chance to manifest themselves and the results are closer to those for averaged payoffs (c.f. Fig. 3 ). In contrast, for large ω heterogeneity plays an important role: for scale-free networks it is guided by the structural heterogeneity whereas in homogenous populations another form of heterogeneity spontaneously emerges in the number of interactions. Even on lattices, stochastic differences in the number of interactions get amplified by the dynamics because an increased number of interactions reduces the chances that an individual updates its strategy (c.f. Fig. 7) . As a consequence the results for lattices and scale-free networks become increasingly similar but scale-free networks keep promoting A types to a greater extend. Parameters and averaging technique are as in the caption to Fig. 3 . ) with a few interactions between updates (ω = 0.02 or, on average, ≈ 0.02 interactions) and b many interactions between updates (ω = 0.98 or, on average, 49 interactions). For small ω the heterogeneity of scale-free networks results in a pronounced tail at higher numbers of interactions compared to the approximately exponential distribution for lattices. This tail is responsible for the reduction of cooperation in scale-free networks observed in Fig. 6 : as interactions dominate, some vertices almost never update their strategies. This "static network" emerges in both lattices and scale-free graphs and prevents the complete proliferation of the rare strategy. Nevertheless, most of the individuals in the population experience essentially the same number of interactions. The distributions look different for large ω but the main difference remains that scale-free networks produce a more pronounced tail. More importantly, however, for most of the population the distributions are actually very similar and hence the heterogeneities very similar. On lattices, the skewed distribution is caused by stochastic variations and the positive feedback between the number of interactions and the resilience to changing strategy. 
